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Foreword by the Secretary of State
After less than three months of innovative Coalition Government, we want to begin real 
change to the benefits system by making it simpler and more efficient, with a view to 
fewer benefits, fewer layers of bureaucracy and with financial support firmly focused 
on making work pay. Less than one year ago, I said that unless politicians and civil 
servants acted to reform our complicated and inefficient benefits system, then further 
talk about work being the best route out of poverty would be more empty rhetoric.
Too often governments have tried to tackle poverty but ended up managing its 
symptoms. The changes outlined here are based on a recognition that poverty  
cannot be tackled through treating the symptoms alone.
The benefits system has shaped the decisions of the poorest in a way that has trapped 
generation after generation in a spiral of dependency and poverty. This has cost the 
country billions of pounds every year in cash payments and billions more in meeting 
the social costs of this failure.
The only way to make a sustainable difference is by tackling the root causes of poverty: 
family breakdown; educational failure; drug and alcohol addiction; severe personal 
indebtedness; and economic dependency.
These problems are interrelated and their solutions lie in society as a whole. However, 
we must recognise that the benefits system has an important role to play in supporting 
personal responsibility and helping to mend social ills.
We are going to end the culture of worklessness and dependency that has done so 
much harm to individuals, families and whole communities. Our aim is to change 
forever a system that has too often undermined work and the aspiration that goes  
with it.
By actively putting work at the centre of working-age support we want to create a  
new contract with the British people, which is why we are consulting them in this paper. 
We will help them to find work and make sure work pays when they do. They in return 
will be expected to seek work and take work when it is available. No longer will we 
leave people for years on long-term benefits without contact or support. This contract 
is about a responsible society working together to improve the quality of life for those 
who are worst off.
The Rt Hon
Iain Duncan Smith MP 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
2 Executive summary 
1. The benefits system as it stands often provides incentives to stay on benefits  
rather than take on a job. We want to support people to move into and progress  
in work, while still supporting those in greatest need. 
2. The Budget outlined the first steps in achieving these goals. However, the scale 
of the Government’s ambition in this area warrants the consideration of more 
fundamental structural reforms. This paper identifies the key failings of the  
benefits system and outlines the objectives we believe the system should  
attempt to achieve. We then focus on how we might seek to address these  
failings and outline some key issues we will need to work through to deliver  
a benefits system for the 21st Century.
3. The framework we are considering greatly improves on earlier reforms because  
it looks at the system of state support for the less well off as a whole and is 
designed to produce positive behavioural effects. We want to maximise work 
incentives while continuing to protect those most in need. 
4. This discussion document outlines illustrative examples of structural reform, 
including options presented by external organisations.
5. Such structural reforms could enable us to deliver some fundamental changes 
to ensure that work always pays and is clearly seen to pay. We could achieve this 
through new rules on how much of their earnings people can keep without losing 
benefit and by withdrawing benefit as earnings rise at a single, reasonable, rate. 
This would mean that people taking the first steps into employment through a few 
hours of work each week would see substantial rewards for their efforts. It would 
also make the system much simpler.
Executive summary. 
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6. We do not aim to reduce the levels of support for people in the most vulnerable 
circumstances but it is clearly important that we ensure support is well targeted,  
is fair to those on low pay and that the right money goes to the right people.
7. Finally, we are looking at how we could use smart automation to deliver support 
without the wasteful bureaucratic delays to payment that make the move 
into work more stressful than it needs to be. Similar technologies are already 
commonplace in the private sector and should make the benefits system quicker 
and more responsive for the customer and more efficient for the taxpayer whilst 
not increasing costs to business. 
8. Our ideas would be consistent with possible steps to make aspects of the 
welfare system more localised. We will also be looking at individual measures 
for increasing work incentives and reducing the extent and costs of welfare 
dependency alongside consideration of reform of the structure of the system.
9. Subject to the outcome of this consultation, we hope to bring forward legislation 
early in the New Year to reform the benefits and Tax Credits system to make work 
pay. We would welcome views on how best to design such a system so as to meet 
our proposed principles and as part of our duties to have due regard to equality.
4 Chapter 1 Introduction
1Introduction. 
1. We said at the outset of this Government that we would investigate how 
to simplify the benefits system in order to improve incentives to work. This 
commitment was restated in the Queen’s Speech and the Budget. The Budget  
also set out the first steps in trying to achieve these aims. However, the 
Government wants to go further to improve incentives and reduce welfare 
dependency. This discussion document takes that work forward. 
2. It is clear that, in common with other countries, we need to address the high  
and increasing costs of welfare dependency. There are now nearly five million 
working-age people receiving the main out-of-work benefits. 1 However, 
worklessness is not just the result of the recession – 1.4 million people have  
been receiving out-of-work benefits for nine or more of the last ten years. 2 
Almost two million children are growing up in households where no-one is in work. 
3. Successive governments have made well-intentioned but piecemeal reforms  
to the system. None have succeeded in tackling the fundamental structural 
problems that undermine personal responsibility and the effectiveness of welfare. 
They have left in place a hugely complex set of interdependent benefits and Tax 
Credits delivered by numerous different agencies.
4. Too many people believe they are better off on benefits than in work. 3 
Existing in-work support means that most should get more income when  
they work, but the gains for many are marginal and incentives are undermined  
by the need to navigate through the maze of in-work and out-of-work benefits  
and their interactions. 
1 Latest Jobseeker’s Allowance Claimant Count figures are available via the Office of National Statistics’ Labour  
Market Statistics; Early estimates for Working Age Inactive Benefit Client Groups, and Benefit Caseload National 
Statistics are available via the Department for Work and Pensions’ Tabulation Tool. 
2 Department for Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (the figure is for people claiming Income Support,  
incapacity benefits and Jobseeker’s Allowance).
3 Examples of the concerns people have about managing financially when moving into a job can be found in  
Woodland S, Mandy W and Miller M, 2003, Easing the transition into work (Part 2: client survey), Department for 
Work and Pensions Research Report No 186.
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5. For example, in about 450,000 cases, Tax Credits awarded by HM Revenue & 
Customs are taken into account as income by the Local Authority in assessing 
Housing Benefit. The system gives with the one hand, only to take away with  
the other. 
6. In short, the overly bureaucratic benefits system can act as a barrier to work, 
trapping people in poverty. 
Affordability 
7. Demographic changes mean that the cost of the welfare system is predicted to 
rise at a time when we can least afford it. We started to address this through the 
measures announced in the Budget, in particular the changes to the uprating of 
benefits, Disability Living Allowance and Housing Benefit. These reforms, along 
with reforms to obligations placed on out-of-work lone parents, build on a wealth 
of evidence that highlights the role of a strong system of conditionality in helping 
those dependent on benefits move into paid work.
8. The next step is to tackle the cost of the system by supporting many more people 
into work. Alongside the introduction of the Work Programme, we believe there  
is a strong case for reforming the system as a whole, addressing the root causes  
of the problems we face. 
Rewarding work and personal responsibility 
9. The experience from previous attempts at piecemeal reform suggest that it is 
unlikely that the full extent of the Government’s ambition can be delivered without 
a more fundamental structural approach. By integrating and reforming the current 
income-related benefits and Tax Credits systems we could ensure that:
•	 	households	and	families	see	the	gains	from	increasing	the	amount	of	paid	 
work they do because they would keep more of their earnings; 
•	 	a	fair	balance	is	struck	between	support	and	conditionality,	making	clear	that	
we will not accept a culture of dependency nor will anyone be written off; and
•	 	positive	behaviours,	such	as	saving	for	retirement	or	buying	your	own	home,	 
are rewarded rather than penalised. 
Reduced worklessness
10. We want to allow more people to do some paid work, and then to remain in work 
and increase their earnings. Getting the balance between these two elements 
will be crucially important. We also want to remove the fear that the system will 
punish them for doing so.
11. We would not propose to force people who are not able to work, or prepare for 
work, to do so. Support for people in the most vulnerable circumstances would 
remain unconditional.
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A fair system that protects those in greatest need
12. Any reforms should also: 
•	 	establish	a	fairer	relationship	between	the	people	who	receive	benefits	 
and the people who pay for them and, as crucially, between the people  
on out-of-work benefits and the people who work in low-paid jobs; 
•	 	target	support	more	efficiently,	supporting	and	protecting	those	in	vulnerable	
circumstances; 
•	 	help	to	divert	people	away	from	the	pathways	that	lead	to	poverty	and	give	
people living in poverty a route out; and
•	 	support	our	wider	goal	of	strengthening	families,	supporting	carers	and	enabling	
disabled people to have an equal role in society. 
A simpler system 
13. The ideas for reform, discussed in this paper, would make it is easier for individuals 
to understand what they are entitled to, easier for people to make or change a 
claim and easier for them to understand how any changes in their circumstances 
will affect their claim. 
Less delay, reduced error and fraud
14. The modern economy moves and changes quickly. Modern government should 
support people to be flexible in taking work, but the current benefits system is too 
cumbersome to do this effectively, creating delays to payments that discourage 
people from moving into work as and when the opportunities arise. Overpayments 
and subsequent repayments can also create serious cash-flow problems, making  
it even more difficult for them to manage their finances.
15. A simpler and fairer system could assess and pay benefits faster and could  
reduce the scope for error and fraud: claimants would more clearly understand 
what they are entitled to and would have less bureaucracy to deal with,  
while people who administer the system would be less likely to make errors. 
16. A more modern automated payments system would bring public services  
into line with the standards we all expect of our banks. It would also allow  
people to be more flexible in taking on temporary work as they could be sure  
that support would be delivered as and when necessary without undue delay.
Conclusion 
17. Work and personal responsibility must be at the heart of the new benefits system. 
This should provide support backed up by a strong system of conditionality that 
makes clear what is expected of claimants in return for the support they receive.  
In the next chapter, we consider in more depth the problems of the current system. 
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2Problems with the  current system. 
Summary 
Our welfare system has failed to keep up with the pace of change in the economy  
and society. Successive governments have made piecemeal reforms without 
rationalising the overall landscape.  
There are two key problems. 
1. Work incentives for some groups are poor: 
•	 	interactions	between	benefits	and	Tax	Credits	make	the	transition	 
to work risky and uncertain; 
•	 	the	financial	incentives	to	enter	work	at	less	than	16	hours	are	 
relatively low: this works against the successes of the strong 
conditionality regime; and
•	 	the	rate	at	which	benefits	and	Tax	Credits	are	withdrawn	as	 
earnings increase means that some people see no more than a  
few pence for every extra £1 earned – resulting in the perception  
that work does not pay.
2. The system is too complex: 
•	 	for	claimants	–	arising	from	the	interaction	between	different	benefits	 
and Tax Credits and layers of previous reforms, with many different  
benefits addressing the same underlying issue and entitlement to  
benefit paid by one agency affecting the benefit payable by another; and
•	 	to	administer	–	where	people	may	need	to	provide	the	same	information	 
to different agencies, often through paper-based transactions.
As a result we have rising costs of state support – including waste through 
unproductive administration, error and fraud – accompanied by high rates of welfare 
dependency and poverty. 
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1. The benefits system has evolved with good intentions but with flawed results. 
Successive governments have tinkered with bits of the system but have failed  
substantially to address: 
•	 	rising	costs	of	state	support;	
•	 	high	rates	of	welfare	dependency	and	poverty;	and
•	 	a	structure	and	set	of	rules	that	can	drive	negative	rather	than	 
positive behaviours.
2. The situation stems from two key underlying problems:
•	 	work	incentives	can	be	poor;	and
•	 	the	system	is	too	complex.
Rising costs of state support 
3. The costs of maintaining a failing system are spiralling out of control; we cannot 
continue spending at such a rate on welfare that all too often has a negative rather 
than a positive impact. In the last decade, spending on working-age benefits and 
Tax Credits rose from £63 billion in 1996/97 to £87 billion in 2009/10 (in real terms, 
2010/11 prices). 4 
4. Multiple agencies use valuable resources to gather and manage largely the same 
information in very similar ways. The Department for Work and Pensions and 
its agencies spend around £2 billion a year to administer and pay working-age 
benefits, Local Authorities spend a further £1 billion to administer Housing  
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit and HM Revenue & Customs spends more than 
£500 million a year. 
5. Overpayments hit the poorest hardest, while error and fraud is estimated to  
cost the taxpayer around £5.2 billion a year: £2.1 billion in Tax Credits (around  
8.9 per cent of entitlement in 2008/09) 5 and £3.1 billion in Department for Work 
and Pensions benefits (around 2.1 per cent in 2009/10).6 Underpayments are also 
a problem, leaving customers without entitlements estimated at £1.3 billion a  
year in benefits and £260 million a year in Tax Credits.7 
4 Department for Work and Pensions expenditure data. 
5 HM Revenue & Customs, 2010, Child and Working Tax Credits Error and Fraud Statistics 2008-09: 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtcredits-error0809.pdf 
6 Department for Work and Pensions, Fraud and Error in the Benefit System: October 2008 to September 2009. 
7 HM Revenue & Customs, 2010, Child and Working Tax Credits Error and Fraud Statistics 2008-09: 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtcredits-error0809.pdf 
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6. As we noted in chapter 1, the cost of welfare is rising at a time when we can least 
afford it. The Budget announced a number of changes to existing benefits to curb 
rises in expenditure and to make the system fairer. Other countries are similarly 
considering their social security spending as public finances deteriorate. For 
example, the Irish government has reduced expenditure on social insurance and 
social assistance schemes through percentage reductions in benefit payments and 
tightening entitlement criteria for certain benefits. In Iceland, austerity measures 
include freezing welfare benefits for two years. In the UK we are considering 
further targeted reforms as part of the Spending Review.
High rates of welfare dependency and poverty
7. Welfare dependency has become a significant and growing problem in Britain,  
with huge social and economic cost for both claimants and wider society.  
The welfare state is now a vast, sprawling bureaucracy that can act to entrench, 
rather than solve, the problems of poverty and social exclusion.
8. 12 million working-age households receive benefits and Tax Credits costing  
more than £85 billion a year. 8 
•	 	More	than	one	in	four	working-age	adults	in	the	UK	do	not	work	and	 
2.6 million people have spent at least half of the last 10 years on some  
form of out-of-work benefit. 9  
•	 	Around	a	fifth	of	families	with	children	are	in	poverty	at	any	one	time,	and	
around two-fifths experience poverty at some time in a three year period. 10 
•	 	35	per	cent	of	families	remain	in	poverty	when	a	parent	enters	work	11 yet 
2.4 million households now receive Working Tax Credit. 12 
9. The welfare system has failed to tackle intergenerational disadvantage and poverty. 
For example, a higher proportion of children grow up in a workless household in the 
UK than in almost any other EU country 13 and the risk of poverty is higher for those 
who are poor as children or teenagers. 14 
Question 1
What steps should the Government consider to reduce the cost of the  
welfare system and reduce welfare dependency and poverty?
8 Cabinet Office, 2010, State of the Nation report: Poverty, worklessness and welfare dependency in the UK, 
HM Government ref 401172/0510. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Browne J and Paull G, 2010, Parents’ work entry, progression and retention and child poverty, Department 
for Work and Pensions Research Report No. 626. 
11 Ibid. 
12 HM Revenue & Customs, April 2010, Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics, Office of National Statistics
13 Eurostat, 2008 data. 
14 Blanden J and Gibbons S, 2006, The persistence of poverty across generations: A view from two British 
cohorts, Report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Bristol: Policy Press. 
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Failure of the current system to generate  
positive behavioural effects 
10. The current benefits system gives little consideration to the behaviours it 
generates. Complexity and poor financial incentives to work are a key factor in 
trapping people in worklessness. This is strongly linked with poverty and reduced 
well-being, poorer physical and mental health and an increased likelihood of 
becoming involved in the Criminal Justice System. Previous changes have failed 
to address the impact of benefits on these issues. Where parents have multiple 
disadvantages (such as low income, poor health, no qualifications), their children 
are also likely to experience disadvantage themselves. 15  
Work incentives can be poor 
11. The current benefits and Tax Credits system influences financial work  
incentives through:
•	 	earnings	disregards	–	the	amount	people	can	earn	without	it	affecting	 
their benefit; 
•	 	additional	payments	for	people	working	at	least	16	or	30	hours	through	 
Tax Credits; and
•	 	tapered	withdrawal	–	the	rate	at	which	earnings	in	excess	of	a	disregard	 
are deducted from benefit.
12. This system currently leaves some groups facing poor work incentives.  
These include lone parents who work less than 16 hours a week and young  
people for whom Working Tax Credit is not available. 
13. People working fewer than 16 hours a week can continue to be eligible for  
out-of-work benefits but, for many claimants, there is little gain as every  
penny of earnings over a small disregard is lost. It is not surprising, therefore,  
that very few people on these benefits are doing any work at all. 16, 17.  
14. Working Tax Credit provides support for people on low wages, but an  
individual or couple must satisfy the minimum-hours rules in order to  
qualify. The upshot is a system that can trap people into certain hours of  
work: they lose disproportionately if they work a few hours less and gain  
little by working more. 
15 Cabinet Office, 2010, State of the Nation report: Poverty, worklessness and welfare dependency in the UK, 
HM Government ref 401172/0510. 
16 Department for Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study. 
17 This does not apply to Employment and Support Allowance claimants who can in some circumstances 
keep £93 a week in earnings and all of their benefit, including (since April 2010) Housing Benefit and  
Council Tax Benefit. 
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15. The introduction of Tax Credits improved work incentives for some groups but  
the picture is still patchy. The Institute for Fiscal Studies 18 has long pointed to 
the problems with work incentives in the current system while evidence from  
the Citizens Advice service shows the negative impact the benefits system has  
on lone parents. 19
16. It is estimated that in total, more than 600,000 people could face a Participation 
Tax Rate 20, 21 in excess of 90 per cent – that is more than 90 per cent of their gross 
earnings are lost through tax and withdrawn benefits. This measure does not 
take account of in-work costs such as travel, which can easily wipe out a meagre 
financial gain.
17. Table 1 below shows the number of people facing Marginal Deduction Rates 22 
of different degrees of severity – it shows for instance that 130,000 people face  
a Marginal Deduction Rate over 90 per cent who would gain 10p or less from a  
£1 increase in their pay because of the amounts lost through tax and withdrawal 
of benefits and Tax Credits. 
Table 1
Marginal Deduction Rates 23 2011-12 
Over 90 per cent 130,000
Over 80 per cent 330,000
Over 70 per cent 1,710,000
Over 60 per cent 1,935,000
Marginal Deduction Rate figures shown are for working heads of families in receipt of income-related benefits or  
Tax Credits where at least one person works 16 hours or more a week, and the head of the family is not receiving  
pensioner or disability premiums. 
18. Figure 1 shows the complex way that benefits and Tax Credits interact with 
earnings to produce an overall household income. The way that benefits and tax 
credits are withdrawn as income rises combines with increased income tax and 
NI contributions to produce high Marginal Deduction Rates in some cases. In this 
example, based on current benefit and tax rates, a couple with a single earner 
and two children sees a Marginal Deduction Rate of 95.5 per cent 24 on earnings 
between £126 and £218. This means that someone at the National Minimum Wage 
would be less than £7 per week better off if they worked 16 extra hours and earned 
an extra £92 (an effective wage rate of 44p per hour). A system that produces this 
result cannot be right. 
18 Adam, A. Brewer, M. and Shephard, A., 2006, Financial Work Incentives in Britain: Comparisons over time and between 
Family Types, IFS WP 06/20. 
19 Citizens Advice, October 2008, Citizens Advice Evidence Briefing: Barriers to work: Lone parents and the challenges 
of working. 
20 Participation Tax Rate – the proportion of gross earnings lost in tax and withdrawn benefits. 
21 This figure was calculated using the Department’s Policy Simulation Model, which is based on the 2007/08 Family 
Resources Survey and includes the tax and benefit policies announced in the June 2010 Budget. Those modelled  
as moving into work are assumed to do so at 25 hours at the minimum wage.
22 Marginal Deduction Rate – the proportion of an additional £1 in income lost in increased income tax and 
NI contributions and in reduced benefit and Tax Credit payments. 
23 HM Treasury, June 2010, Budget 2010. The table shows people working over 16 hours a week and receiving
income-related benefits or Tax Credits.
24 The changes in the June 2010 Budget will increase the maximum Marginal Deduction Rate to 95.95 per cent. 
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19. Leaving the security of the benefits system is made harder by uncertainty about 
how to get benefits reinstated quickly if the job does not work out. Distinct in-work 
benefits have failed to convince some people to make the transition to work.  
People often worry about the loss of Housing Benefit when they are thinking  
of returning to work, or are concerned that their Working Tax Credit may not  
be accurate or paid quickly enough.25.
20. People planning a move into work have understandable concerns about how they 
will support their families during the transition. They ask themselves: “Will the  
in-work benefits kick in quickly enough to fill the gap before my pay arrives?”  
and “How long will it take to get out-of-work benefits again if the job does not  
work out?”. 
25 Gloster, R et al, 2010, Lone Parent Obligations: Early findings of implementation as well as experiences of the Income 
Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance regimes. Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No. 645. 
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21. The complexity of the system means that these legitimate questions can be 
difficult to answer. The fear and uncertainty that people experience when thinking 
about returning to work is real and understandable. For many, the world of work  
is an unknown that raises feelings of apprehension. Underpinning their fears is  
the perception that the rewards from working are small, leaving people feeling  
that they are being punished for working while their neighbours are rewarded for 
doing nothing. 
22. As a result, working legitimately is not a rational choice for many poor people to 
make. Fraud is always wrong, but we must recognise that the benefits system is 
making matters worse by pushing valuable work, and the aspiration that this can 
engender, underground. 26 
Box 1 Case study: weak work incentives in the current system
Ms A, a lone parent with three school-age children, earns £7.50 an hour as an 
office administrator. She is working 23 hours a week, which gives her a net  
weekly income (including benefits and Tax Credits) of £345 after paying rent and 
Council Tax. She has been offered the opportunity to work for 34 hours a week. 
However, this extra effort would only give her about £10 more, so she has very 
little incentive to take on the extra work.
Question 2 
Which aspects of the current benefits and Tax Credits system in particular  
lead to the widely held view that work does not pay for benefit recipients?
The system is too complex 
23. The complexity of the system is also a barrier in itself. Successive attempts to 
adapt the benefits system to meet immediate priorities have resulted in layer  
upon layer of ill-fitting changes, often with long periods of transitional protection, 
adding steadily to the complexity. 
24. There are three basic income-maintenance benefits for people who are out  
of work: Jobseeker’s Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance (replacing 
Incapacity Benefit) and Income Support, all paid by the Department for Work and  
Pensions and often providing the same level of financial support. These benefits 
combine with Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, Child Tax Credit and – for people 
moving into work – Working Tax Credit to create an elaborate and confusing tangle 
of support. Added to this are contributory and universal benefits which create 
further benefit interactions.  
26 Barbour A, 2008, Work Incentives in the benefits system: Increasing levels of Earnings Disregard, Community links 
Evidence No. 12; SPARK Research, 2004, A Review of the DWP Benefit Fraud Sanctions Regime, Department for 
Work and Pensions In-house report. 
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25. This complexity is inefficient, with customers having to go through multiple 
application processes with different thresholds, rules and payment periods.  
It also increases the risk of error, creates opportunities for fraud and puts  
decisions on benefit expenditure beyond effective democratic scrutiny. 27 
26. The overlaps in what people can receive are significant. People can get support 
from different benefits and different benefits support the same needs. A lone 
parent with a young child, for example, might be receiving Income Support, Child 
Benefit, Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and a series of other 
‘passported’ benefits, each with their own eligibility criteria and rules. 
27. Many people have to deal with more than one agency. Nearly half of the six 
million people getting benefits from the Department for Work and Pensions also 
get Housing Benefit from a Local Authority. Around 1.6 million people receive a 
Department for Work and Pensions benefit and some Tax Credits from HM Revenue 
& Customs. About a third of Housing Benefit claimants also receive Tax Credits  
and have to deal with both HM Revenue & Customs and their Local Authority.  
This includes virtually all families with children on Housing Benefit. 
28. Research shows that this complexity makes it difficult for people to know what 
benefits and Tax Credits they can get. Sometimes people are overpaid Tax Credits 
and have to return money later. Complexity undermines trust in the system and 
stops customers focusing on getting back to work. 28 People may fail to take up 
their entitlements. The transition between benefits and work can also cause  
severe financial hardship and emotional stress. 29 People from ethnic minority 
groups are more likely to have English as their second language and so may  
have particular difficulty with benefit complexity. 30
Box 2 Case study: transitions between benefits
Mr B is claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance. After suffering an accident, he loses 
entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance because his work capability is limited.  
He needs to claim the Employment and Support Allowance to continue to  
receive financial support. Any delay in making this claim could mean that he 
loses money and he could also lose support for his rent and Council Tax. It can 
take Jobcentre Plus a week or two to sort out Mr B’s Employment and Support 
Allowance claim, during which time he may need to claim a Social Fund Crisis 
Loan to pay for food and other living expenses. After three months, Mr B has 
recovered enough to start looking for work again. His Employment and Support 
Allowance then ends and he has to claim Jobseeker’s Allowance again.
Question 3 
To what extent is the complexity of the system deterring some people from 
moving into work?
27 Martin, D, 2009, Benefit simplification: How, and why, it must be done, Centre for Policy Studies. 
28 Community Links, Low Incomes Tax Reform Group, CPAG, 2007, Interact: benefits, Tax Credits and moving into 
work; (2010) Royston, S, 2007, Benefit simplification and the customer, Department for Work and Pensions paper 
www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/simplification-and-the-customer.pdf; Sainsbury R and Weston K, 2010, Exploratory qualitative 
research on the ‘Single Working Age Benefit’. 
29 Department for Work and Pensions Customer Insight evidence, 2010, Single Working Age Benefit findings, 
www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/customer-insight-single-working-age-benefit.pdf
30 Disability Alliance (2003), Out of Sight – Race Inequality in the benefit system.
21st Century Welfare 15
Complexity in delivery
“The Department for Work and Pensions issues a total of 14 manuals, with a  
total of 8,690 pages, to its decision makers to help them to apply Department  
for Work and Pensions benefit rules correctly. A separate set of four volumes 
totalling over 1,200 pages covers Housing and Council Tax Benefits, which are 
primarily the responsibility of local authorities. The Tax Credits manual used by 
HM Revenue & Customs is a further 260 pages, even though it omits details for 
many relevant tax concepts which are found in other tax manuals. In addition  
to these encyclopaedic works is a cornucopia of circulars, news releases and 
guidance notes issued to professionals and claimants. The underlying legal 
statutes and statutory instruments make up a vast mass of further material.” 
(from David Martin, Benefit Simplification: How, and why, it must be done 31).  
29. Given the range of benefits and agencies, it is hardly surprising that delivery is  
also fragmented and complex, requiring customers to make multiple contacts  
with different organisations. Applying for, varying or leaving benefits still requires 
too much paperwork from too many different government agencies and too much 
unproductive time dealing with officials either face-to-face or on the phone. 
30. Customers may be required to communicate changes of circumstance separately 
to Jobcentre Plus, the Pension, Disability and Carers Service, the Local Authority 
and HM Revenue & Customs so that adjustments can be made to payments they 
receive. In many circumstances, the same information is requested several times 
over. This increases the number of unnecessary customer contacts, at a cost to 
both the customer and the taxpayer, and creates potential for error and fraud. 
31. When people do move into work, delays in payment can occur as claims stop  
and start and entitlement is reassessed. This can affect crucial support, including 
in-work Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. A significant number of people 
each year transfer between Jobseeker’s Allowance and incapacity benefits alone,  
even though the claim is with the same agency. 
32. Delays in awarding or reassessing entitlement cause negative experiences of the 
general service. 32, 33 The resulting overpayments (and subsequent repayments) 
can affect those least able to cope with fluctuations in their relatively low levels  
of household income which can create stress and mistrust of the system.
Question 4
To what extent is structural reform needed to deliver customer service 
improvements, drive down administration costs and cut the levels of  
error, overpayments and fraud?
31 Martin, D, 2009, Benefit Simplification: How, and why, it must be done, Centre for Policy Studies. 
32 Gloster, R et al, 2010, Lone Parent Obligations: Early findings of implementation as well as experiences of the 
Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance regimes. Department for Work and Pensions Research Report 645. 
33 Department for Work and Pensions Customer Insight evidence, 2010, Well enough to work findings, 
www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/customer-insight-well-enough-to-work.pdf.  
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Conclusion 
33. The Government has strong ambitions for the benefit system. The current 
problems and experience from previous reforms suggest that structural reform  
of the benefits and Tax Credits system as a whole may be needed to address  
the key problems of work incentives and complexity. In the next chapter we  
look at how we might do this and outline a set of principles to guide reform.  
In addition, there are complex interactions with other forms of welfare support  
for basic needs (for example, the financing of affordable housing provision and 
sub-market rents) and different options for delivery of a reformed system.  
Chapters 4 and 5 explore these.
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3Principles and  options for reform. 
Summary 
We have set out seven principles for reform which could guide the detailed design  
of the system. 
This chapter outlines illustrative examples of how structural reform might look, 
including options presented by external organisations.
While they do it in different ways, these models all ensure that clearer gains are 
available as individuals move into and progress in work, and attempt to ensure  
that dependency is reduced in the longer term in order to improve the affordability  
of the system.
More work will also be needed to ensure that the specific design issues outlined  
are addressed, and that the relative costs and benefits of different reform options 
are assessed. 
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Principles for reform
1. We would propose to use a set of principles to guide reform. They could be to:
•	 	ensure	that	people	can	see	that	the	clear	rewards	from	taking	all	types	 
of work outweigh the risks;
•	 	further	incentivise	and	encourage	households	and	families	to	move	into	 
work and to increase the amount of work they do, by improving the rewards 
from work at low earnings, and helping them keep more of their earnings as 
they work harder;
•	 	increase	fairness	between	different	groups	of	benefit	recipients	and	between	
recipients and the taxpayer; 
•	 	continue	to	support	those	most	in	need	and	reduce	the	numbers	of	workless	
households and children in poverty and ensure that interactions with other 
systems of support for basic needs are considered;
•	 	promote	responsibility	and	positive	behaviour,	doing	more	to	reward	saving,	
strengthening the family and, in tandem with improving incentives, reinforcing 
conditionality; 
•	 	automate	processes	and	maximise	self	service,	to	reduce	the	scope	for	fraud,	
error and overpayments. This could include a responsive and immediate service 
that saves the taxpayer significant amounts of money and ensures compliance  
costs for employers, at worst, no worse than under the current system; and
•	 	ensure	that	the	benefits	and	Tax	Credits	system	is	affordable	in	the	short	and	
longer term.
Question 5
Has the Government identified the right set of principles to use to  
guide reform?
A simpler system with improved work incentives 
2. In order to put our principles into practice it is essential to improve work incentives. 
Different approaches could be designed to give greater emphasis to either 
increasing the incentive to take up work, or to increasing the incentive to increase 
earnings once in work. Striking a balance between these elements will be important.
3. With this in mind, there are two key areas where structural reform of the system 
could focus: firstly, the number and types of benefits and Tax Credits available 
should be considered; and secondly the way in which entitlements are withdrawn 
as individuals move into and progress in work could be adjusted.
4. The models outlined below consider these areas, and demonstrate the range of 
choices that structural reform would need to consider. Chapter 5 considers how 
reform of welfare delivery could also deliver improvements to the system. 
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A Universal Credit
5. A Universal Credit would be a new approach to supporting working-age 
households. It represents a move towards a system that brings together existing 
income-related out-of-work benefits and Tax Credits into a simpler, integrated 
system that supports people in and out of work. This builds on recommendations 
from a number of organisations from across the social policy field. 34 It would:
•	 	combine	elements	of	the	current	income-related	benefits	and	Tax	 
Credits systems;
•	 	bring	out-of-work	and	in-work	support	together	in	a	single	system;	and
•	 	supplement	household	earnings	through	credit	payments,	reflecting	
circumstances (including children, housing and disability).
6. Such a structure would remove much of the complexity that burdens the system 
today. Crucially it would also create the platform for tackling the current problems 
of high Marginal Deduction Rates and low gains to work through reform of earnings 
disregards and tapers. 
Box 3 How might a Universal Credit work?
•	 What would I get if I was out of work? The family’s gross entitlement 
would depend on their circumstances. Entitlements would be based on  
current benefit and Tax Credit rules, with amounts for individuals, couples, 
children, housing, disability or caring. The total would then be reduced for 
earnings and other income to produce the net amount payable. The credit 
would be payable to the household member making the application.
•	 How would Universal Credit support me to move into and progress in work? 
Household members would be incentivised to enter work by a consistent, 
reasonable, rate of withdrawal of the Universal Credit as earnings increase.  
The incentive would be reinforced through a system of disregards, which  
would leave Universal Credit payments unaffected by the first few hours  
of earnings.
•	 What would happen to Tax Credits? A Universal Credit would subsume Tax 
Credits as the form of income top-up for families on low earnings, including 
support for childcare. 
•	 How would this be delivered? Universal Credit would be delivered through 
a new system which would use up-to-date earnings information from  
employers to calculate Universal Credit on a household basis – see chapter 5. 
•	 What would happen to the Work Capability Assessment? This would still 
be needed to assess applications from customers unable to work through 
sickness or disability.
34 Martin D, 2009, Benefit Simplification: How and why it must be done, Centre for Policy Studies; 
Centre for Social Justice, 2009, Dynamic Benefits: Towards welfare that works; Brewer M, Saez E 
and Shephard A, 2008, Means Testing and Tax Rates on earnings, Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
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Universal Credit – outline structure
7. Figure 2 below shows a possible outline structure for a Universal Credit system.  
For someone who is not working it would integrate a range of existing benefits  
and Tax Credits into a single payment. The amount received would depend 
on needs and circumstances. The Universal Credit could include the following 
elements of support, as appropriate:
•	 	basic	income	replacement	for	single	people	and	couples	similar	to	the	 
rates of Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income Support and Employment and  
Support Allowance;
•	 	help	with	mortgage	interest	and	other	housing	costs	currently	available	 
through those benefits;
•	 	help	with	rent	and	council	tax	currently	provided	through	Housing	Benefit	 
and Council Tax Benefit; and 
•	 	extra	help	for	families	in	place	of	Child	Tax	Credit.	
8. As we develop thinking on detailed rules, there might be scope to simplify and 
improve the focus of some of these elements of support relative to their current 
design. We would in any case separately consider the role of additional income-
related payments for disability as we develop ideas on disability benefit reform.  
It would not, however, be our intention to use Universal Credit reform to reduce  
the levels of support for people in the most vulnerable circumstances. At the 
appropriate stage, we will assess the impact of our proposals on vulnerable groups.
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9. The Universal Credit would gradually be reduced as post-tax household incomes 
rose. Entitlement to support would be available to people out of work and those 
with low earnings. There would continue to be some non-means-tested support, 
including contributory entitlements for people who have paid National Insurance 
contributions, but generally the amount of benefit payable would depend on the 
level of household income and savings. The impact of earnings on entitlement 
would be worked out using a system of disregards and a single Universal Credit 
withdrawal rate.
10. Alongside development of online services this could mean that people claiming 
Universal Credit would have access to a clear statement showing their earnings 
and entitlement to the Universal Credit in one place. This would be a huge 
improvement on the current system in which people have no access to a single 
statement of their entitlements.
Disregards and tapers 
11. Chapter 2 highlighted the problem of poor financial work incentives and 
uncertainty, making people feel that it is not worth their while to take a job  
or to increase their hours. 
12. To improve incentives to work (especially for low earners), people entering paid 
work would ideally see no reduction in their Universal Credit until they earn over 
a certain level (the earnings disregard). The level of this earnings disregard might 
depend on household circumstances. We would need to consider further, in the 
light of fiscal circumstances, how best to design the disregards. However, it may 
make sense to provide larger disregards for some groups, such as families bringing 
up children.
13. In order further to improve the incentive to earn more, the system might involve 
applying a single taper to reduce the Universal Credit where earnings (net of tax 
and National Insurance) exceed the level of the earnings disregard. This taper 
could apply to all earnings, regardless of the number of hours worked. It could  
also provide a single withdrawal rate in place of the current different withdrawal 
rates across out-of-work benefits, Tax Credits, Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefit. Currently, these interact in complicated ways and produce very high  
overall Marginal Deduction Rates for many people. 
14. A single withdrawal rate would make it clearer and simpler to calculate the 
financial gains from work and for people to be confident of being better off  
by taking a job and progressing to more hours and higher pay once in work.  
15. In the current fiscal climate we need to strike a balance between incentives  
and affordability. This trade-off would, in particular, affect the rate of withdrawal 
that is feasible if a Universal Credit is introduced. 
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16. However, by way of illustration, for people paying Income Tax at 20p in the pound 
and National Insurance contributions at 12p in the pound, a withdrawal rate of  
55 per cent would lead to an overall Marginal Deduction Rate of 69.4 per cent;  
a withdrawal rate of 70 per cent would lead to an overall Marginal Deduction  
Rate of 79.6 per cent. This compares with a current Marginal Deduction Rate  
of 73 per cent for people getting Working Tax Credit or Child Tax Credit only,  
90.55 per cent for people getting Housing Benefit in addition to Tax Credits  
and 95.95 per cent for people getting Tax Credits, Housing Benefit and Council  
Tax Benefit.
A Single Unified Taper
17. A Single Unified Taper would retain a set of benefits reflecting that different 
families need support for different reasons. This means that both the major  
out-of-work benefits and the system of Tax Credits would be retained. However, we 
could also consider reform of certain benefits within or alongside a new structure. 
It would not be our intention to use reform to reduce the levels of support for 
people in the most vulnerable circumstances. Overall the total number of benefits 
available could be reduced and the system simplified.
18. It is hoped the model could then be delivered according to the principles of 
a reformed delivery system outlined in chapter 5. Once eligibility has been 
calculated, the system could work without earnings disregards and withdraw 
benefit entitlement in such a way that a person’s Marginal Deduction Rate is 
constant until benefit receipt is exhausted. 
19. As an individual increased their income, withdrawal would be through a taper 
that would be applied to their overall benefit eligibility, rather than the individual 
benefits as is currently the case. This would remove the complex interactions that 
currently cause high Marginal Deduction Rates. As an example, if the Single Unified 
Taper were set at 75 per cent:
•	 	an	out-of-work	individual,	or	an	individual	with	earnings	below	the	threshold	
where they began to pay tax and National Insurance contributions, would 
face a taper rate of 75 per cent. This would be applied to their overall benefit 
receipt, not individual benefits, meaning that this would also be their Marginal 
Deduction Rate: they would increase their net income by £2.50 for every £10 
they earned; and
•	 	an	individual	with	earnings	above	the	threshold	for	paying	tax	and	National	
Insurance contributions would face a taper rate on their overall benefit receipt 
of 43 per cent as they increased their earnings. Combined with the tax they  
paid (32 per cent income tax and National Insurance) this would lead them  
to the same Marginal Deduction Rate of 75 per cent: they would increase  
their net income by £2.50 for every extra £10 they earned.
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20. This would mean that individuals on benefits or Tax Credits keep the same amount 
of every pound they earn as they move into and progress in work. Thus, for every 
decision about entering or progressing in work, the claimant could know the exact 
amount they will keep after benefits and Tax Credits have been withdrawn.
21. As well as making current incentives more clear, such a system could also improve 
the incentive to enter work and to progress to higher incomes by reducing Marginal 
Deduction Rates and Participation Tax Rates. This is particularly true for those 
on low incomes and those on out-of-work benefits who currently have benefit 
withdrawn pound for pound with earnings. By retaining separate out-of-work 
benefits and Tax Credits, this approach also provides targeted incentives for people 
to increase their hours of work. Figure 3 shows how this could work. A balance 
between incentives and affordability would need to be struck when considering  
the rate at which the Single Unified Taper was set.
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Box 4 How might a Single Unified Taper work?
•	 What would I get if I was out of work? The family’s gross entitlement 
would depend on their circumstances and would be broadly similar to today’s 
system as the majority of the current benefits and Tax Credits would be 
retained. The total would then be reduced for earnings and other income  
to produce the net amount payable. The credit would be payable to the 
household member making the application.
•	 How would Single Unified Taper support me to move into and progress 
in work? Household members would be incentivised to enter work by a 
consistent, reasonable, rate of withdrawal of benefits as earnings increase.  
This would be lower than the current 100 per cent withdrawal of benefits  
as claimants move into work.
•	 What would happen to Tax Credits? Tax Credits would be maintained to 
provide targeted support for families to enter and progress in work.
•	 How would this be delivered? The Single Unified Taper would be delivered 
through a new system which would use up-to-date earnings information  
from employers to calculate the Single Unified Taper on a household basis  
– see Chapter 5.
•	 What would happen to the Work Capability Assessment? This would still 
be needed to assess applications from customers unable to work through 
sickness or disability.
Single Working Age Benefit
22. The Institute for Public Policy Research have proposed a model for a Single  
Working Age Benefit. 35 This concept of a single benefit is a simple flat rate 
benefit that would give all working age claimants the same level of replacement 
income, regardless of whether they were jobseekers, lone parents, sick or disabled.
23. The other key features of this model would be:
•	 	no	contributory	entitlement	(the	paper	argues	that	the	contributory	principle	 
in working age benefits is misunderstood and of little real value);
•	 a	universal	non-means-tested	entitlement	for	the	first	12	weeks	out	of	work;
•	 all	benefit	beyond	12	weeks	to	be	means-tested;	and
•	 the	option	of	individualised	entitlement	for	couples.
24. The Institute for Public Policy Research envisage that the Single Working Age 
Benefit would replace existing out-of-work benefits. It assumes that there would 
continue to be separate provision for extra costs and that Tax Credits would  
remain as now.
35 Sainsbury R and Stanley K, 2007, One for all: active welfare and the single working age benefit, 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
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Mirrlees model
25. The Mirrlees model, proposed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, 36 uses optimal tax 
theory to design an efficient system of household tax and transfer programmes. 
This model would replace Child Tax Credit, Working Tax Credit, Income Support/
Jobseeker’s Allowance, Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and Child Benefit with 
an integrated ‘family allowance’ paid directly into bank accounts and withdrawn 
using the withholding system for Income Tax.
26. The allowance would be far less generous than current Income Support levels 
(£50 for a single person), but earnings up to £90 would have no impact on the 
allowance, and earnings above this subject to a 30 per cent withdrawal rate  
(with an additional 15 per cent on the housing element). Tax allowances would  
be adjusted so that tax and NI would be payable once the earnings disregard had  
been exhausted.
27. The model would replace all family benefits, housing support and Tax Credits and 
assumes that the family allowance would be tapered through the tax system. 
Support for families out of work would be substantially less than current benefits. 
The Mirrlees model represents a more complete integration of Income Tax and 
benefits than some other models.
Single benefit/negative income tax model
28. The TaxPayers’ Alliance 37 recently published a report that recommends a reform 
that brings together a large number of the existing benefits. However, unlike 
other approaches that introduce a single benefit, it suggests the introduction of 
a negative income tax. This would replace current income-replacement benefits 
and tax credits. Alongside this, they suggest the maintenance of a number of the 
current benefits aimed at supporting those with a limited ability to work or who 
need extra support. 
29. A household’s eligibility for the negative income tax would be based on their 
characteristics, and set equal to a given proportion of (equivalised) median  
income. As household income increased from individuals moving into work or 
progressing in work, the level of the negative income tax would be reduced in  
such a way that the Marginal Deduction Rate (inclusive of Income Tax, NI 
contributions and the withdrawal of the negative income tax) was constant  
until all support was exhausted. This implies that the system does not have  
a system of earnings disregards.
36  J. Mirrlees, S. Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. Johnson, G. Myles and J. Poterba (eds),  
April 2010, Dimensions of Tax Design: the Mirrlees Review, OUP. 
37  Taylor C, Denham M, Baron R and Allum A, Welfare Reform in Tough Fiscal Times: Creating a Better and Cheaper 
Benefit System The TaxPayers’ Alliance, July 2010.  
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Question 6 
Would an approach along the lines of the models set out in chapter 3  
improve work incentives and hence help the Government to reduce costs  
and tackle welfare dependency and poverty? Which elements would be  
most successful? What other approaches should the Government consider?
Conclusion
30. There are a number of different approaches to simplifying benefits and Tax  
Credits that could improve work incentives and make the available support  
easier to understand. This chapter has explored some of the different options 
available. We will also look at targeted measures for increasing work incentives 
and reducing the extent and costs of welfare dependency alongside consideration 
of structural reform.
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4Other areas of reform. 
Summary 
The potential for structural reform to the benefits and tax system brings with it 
the opportunity to consider other reforms of the system. External organisations 
have suggested that it is important to consider the role of conditionality and the 
contributory principle in reinforcing work incentives and providing support. There  
are also wider questions over the role of localism in the delivery of system welfare.
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1. Chapter 3 set out a number of options for structural reforms of the welfare system 
that could improve work incentives. Many of the reforms suggested by external 
organisations suggest that the role of the current system of conditionality and 
contributory benefits should be considered alongside potential structural reforms.
Conditionality
2. Individuals who are able to look for work or prepare for work should be required 
to do so as a condition for receiving benefit and those who fail to meet their 
responsibilities should face a sanction such as a benefit reduction. This is 
known as conditionality. Evidence shows conditionality is effective in reducing 
unemployment. So it is essential that any changes to the structure of support are 
underpinned by clear expectations about what claimants need to do in return for 
the support they receive. In particular, any new arrangements should not water 
down the current conditionality for jobseekers.
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3. In the current system the benefit claimed determines the level of conditionality. 
Generally Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants must engage in active job search,  
with powers to extend conditions the longer a person is out of work. Evidence 
shows conditionality is effective in reducing unemployment. Any future reforms  
should seek to build on that success. Lone parents on Income Support and  
people in the Employment and Support Allowance work-related activity group 
must attend work-focused interviews. Figure 4 on the previous page illustrates  
the current system of conditionality for people on out-of-work benefits. 
4. Some of the structural reforms could merge many of these benefits into a single 
payment. This creates the possibility that the level of conditionality would be 
determined, not by the benefit received, but by the reason for receiving benefit, 
creating a single progression to higher levels of conditionality. Structural reforms 
could also remove the distinction between in- and out-of-work benefits, enabling a 
new approach to conditionality that aimed to incentivise people to enter work and 
progress – increasing hours and earnings until they move off benefits altogether. 
5. This would raise the issue of when a person is deemed to be doing enough  
work such that we would stop applying work-related conditions to their benefit.  
For example, it may not be sensible to cease applying conditions as soon as a 
person earns any income as that would increase the temptation for some people  
to remain working for just a few hours, thereby increasing welfare costs and 
fostering dependency rather than self sufficiency. We ought to look at applying 
conditionality in a way that pushes individuals to increase their work to levels  
that are appropriate to their own particular circumstances. For instance:  
•	 	A single person working 17 hours a week at the National Minimum Wage. 
Under the current system, no conditionality applies despite the fact that  
the individual may be claiming a range of benefits. Under a new system  
we could continue to apply conditionality to push that individual to extend  
their working hours and/or increase their earnings until they were working  
full time or until they were off benefits altogether.  
•	 	Jobseekers. Currently most Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants are required 
to look for full-time work. In the future, for some individuals (for example, 
where the person had been away from the labour market for many years) 
conditionality could initially be used to move a person into work for a few  
hours. This work experience combined with ongoing conditionality could  
act as a stepping stone into sustained full-time work. The existing system  
may hamper the first step of this journey by requiring an immediate focus  
on full-time work, regardless of individual circumstances.
•	 	Benefit claimants who currently have no work search conditionality 
applied (for example because of ill health or caring responsibilities). 
We could apply conditionality to match financial incentives for working  
even relatively short hours where appropriate – requiring some people  
to look for or prepare for work of a few hours a week in line with their  
capability and circumstances – and extend conditionality as an individual’s 
circumstances change (for example, when their health improves). 
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6. Such an approach would require careful consideration to ensure that a personalised 
conditionality regime did not dilute or undermine the current success of 
conditionality in incentivising and promoting work. Our key aim is to make it much 
clearer that the commitment to work is the foundation of the benefits system for 
people of working age. This is at the heart of our thinking. We could ask everyone 
who is able to work, or to take steps to prepare for work, to sign a document 
setting out their obligations and the activity required to satisfy those obligations.  
7. For those who fail to meet their obligations we may withdraw their benefit until 
they demonstrate that they have re-engaged with their personalised set of 
commitments. For those closest to the labour market this loss of benefit for the 
period of their non-compliance may be permanent. For others, some or all of their 
withheld benefit may be paid to them once they demonstrate re-engagement. 
We could explore the role that non-financial sanctions can play in encouraging 
compliance. We could also look again at the way the current safeguards against  
the risk of hardship operate and whether they need modernising to ensure that  
our wider reforms work effectively for everyone. However, financial support for 
people who are not able to work, or prepare for work, would remain unconditional.
Question 7 
Do you think we should increase the obligations on benefit claimants  
who can work to take the steps necessary to seek and enter work?
Question 8 
Do you think that we should have a system of conditionality which aims  
to maximise the amount of work a person does, consistent with their  
personal circumstances?
Localisation
8. The UK has a highly centralised system of benefit design and delivery. There are 
a number of advantages to this, not least in terms of economies of scale and 
ensuring national safety nets. However, a number of other countries, including 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States, operate more devolved 
welfare systems, which can stimulate innovation and ensure that systems are 
more aligned to local circumstances.
9. There are a number of options for moving to a less centralised welfare system.  
In terms of incremental reform there could be more discretion to advisers at the 
local level – currently there are limited funding streams (the Adviser Discretionary 
Fund) and little wider autonomy at Jobcentre Plus district level. 
Question 9
If you agree that there should be greater localism what local flexibility would 
be required to deliver this?
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Linkages with other forms of labour market  
and welfare support
10. The benefits system is not the only way in which the Government seeks to support 
those in need. People out of work sometimes need to gain specific skills to enter 
and progress in employment and training. Any training offered needs to be flexible, 
responsive and relevant to the labour market and should facilitate the flexibility 
to continue training once in work. Another example is Government support for the 
provision of affordable housing and sub market rents. We recognise the imperative 
to increase the supply of new homes, including new affordable homes, and to 
ensure sustainable funding for the affordable homes that we already have.
Question 10 
The Government is committed to delivering more affordable homes. How  
could reform best be implemented to ensure providers can continue to  
deliver the new homes we need and maintain the existing affordable homes?
Contributory Benefits
11. Contributory benefits play an important role in the system. However, reforms will 
need to consider the balance between contributory benefits and targeting support 
on those with the lowest incomes. 
Northern Ireland
12. Social Security is a devolved matter in Northern Ireland. The Government will 
continue to work closely with the devolved administration in Northern Ireland  
to seek to maintain a single system across the United Kingdom.
Conclusion 
13. The illustrative options for structural reform outlined in chapter 3 and suggestions 
from external organisations present us with the opportunity to consider a range of 
other issues in the current welfare system. As we continue to consider the case for 
reform, we will consider:
•	 	the	scope	to	strengthen	the	conditionality	regime	and	ensure	that	it	is	 
aligned with any reforms to the system; 
•	 	the	scope	for	having	a	more	tailored,	personalised	system	in	which	the	
conditionality regime for people within certain groups could be extended; 
•	 the	role	of	localism	in	delivering	the	welfare	system;	and	
•	 	having	a	system	which	supports	the	Government’s	aim	of	moving	everyone	 
who can work into work and to maximise the percentage of a person’s income 
that comes from their earnings. 
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5Delivery of a  reformed system. 
Summary 
A 21st century welfare system requires a 21st century delivery solution.
More work would be needed to decide the most cost-effective approach to delivery, 
including how best to define the relationship between the Department for Work  
and Pensions’ delivery agencies, HM Revenue & Customs and Local Authorities.
We envisage an integrated IT system to manage all claims, and a single payment 
system to apply a withdrawal rate and pay the correct entitlement. These would  
not be entirely new systems and could be built on our existing IT and capabilities.
HM Revenue & Customs is consulting employers and payroll providers on mechanisms 
that could support more frequent or real-time collection of Pay As You Earn data. 
Such a system could also enable the use of real-time earnings data to calculate  
net entitlement, removing the need for claimants to notify different agencies  
when their earnings change. 
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1. As described in chapter 2, the process of claiming benefits can be complex 
and confusing, with large numbers of different benefits available for similar or 
overlapping needs. Customers often have to deal with at least three different  
layers of national and local government, providing the same information multiple 
times. A simpler, fairer and less costly system which reduces these difficulties 
would be welcomed by customers, staff businesses and taxpayers alike. 38, 39 
2. A new delivery system could lessen bureaucracy and reduce the risk for people 
moving from benefits to work by making the system more responsive to 
fluctuations in earnings. People would be able to access support without  
endless form-filling and waiting.
Reforming delivery 
3. Our ideas for structural reform have significant implications for the way support 
is delivered and for how individuals interact with the system. We will ensure that 
our approach to delivery maximises the opportunity to increase efficiency, improve 
customer service and reduce the cost of administration. The goal is a delivery 
system fit for the 21st Century. 
4. The ideas in this paper raise a number of choices about delivery routes. More work 
will be needed to identify the most cost-effective approach to delivery. Knowledge 
of our customers will be essential in ensuring that any new system is genuinely 
simpler and easier to use. 
5. We envisage that customers would be able to make a single application for  
all major entitlements, ending the excessive form-filling of the current system.  
Within a household, one person would make the claim and receive the payment. 
The claims process would be as simple as possible and would build on existing 
plans within the Department for Work and Pensions to develop full online services. 
6. We would also need to consider carefully the current organisation of work  
between the Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue & Customs  
and Local Authorities. We will work with all delivery agencies to establish  
how delivery can best be integrated and what this might mean in practice  
not only for all individuals but also for all types of business.
38 Hall, S, 2009, Spending priorities in the benefits system: Deliberative research with the public, Department for 
Work and Pensions Research Report 559. 
39 Royston, S, 2007, Benefit simplification and the customer, Department for Work and Pensions paper. 
www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/simpification-and-the-customer.pdf. 
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Assessing entitlement and making payments
7. The IT changes that would be necessary to deliver a more integrated system 
would not constitute a major IT project, but two developments building on  
existing technologies. 
8. A system to manage contact with customers, gather evidence and assess a 
household’s entitlement to support could be built using existing technology  
in everyday use in both the public and private sector. 
9. A second system would be required to bring together a household’s total 
entitlement and information on their earnings. It would then use these pieces  
of information to apply the withdrawal rates and make the correct payment.  
This payment system could be built around the BACS system which is already  
used to pay benefits to 96 per cent of Department for Work and Pensions 
customers. Payments for self-employed people and others not covered by the PAYE 
system would need to be delivered differently but would be part of the system.
10. Alongside this paper, HM Revenue & Customs is seeking views from employers and 
payroll providers on mechanisms that could support more frequent or real-time 
collection of Pay As You Earn data. Under a new system that used real-time data, 
employers would report their employees’ earnings to HM Revenue & Customs at 
the time those earnings are paid, rather than only at the end of the financial year. 
11. Such a system could also present opportunities to use real-time earnings data in 
the calculation of entitlement. Access to real-time earnings data would remove 
the need for customers to notify changes of income, and make the system more 
responsive to fluctuating earnings and movements into or out of work. This could 
largely resolve the issue of overpayments and subsequent repayments, which hit 
the poorest hardest.
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12. However, welfare reform could still be delivered if HM Revenue & Customs  
does not take forward changes to Pay As You Earn. This could entail a series  
of fixed period awards with customers required to notify any changes of income;  
a similar system to this was previously used in Australia.
13. More work will be needed over the coming months to decide on a preferred 
approach. 
Tackling error, overpayments and fraud
14. The causes of error, overpayments and fraud in the current system fall into  
three categories.
•	 	The	complex	and	fragmented	nature	of	the	system.	This	causes	staff	and	
customer errors and enables customers to represent themselves differently  
to different parts of the system.
•	 	Means-testing	rules.	We	rely	on	customers	letting	us	know	about	their	earnings,	
savings and other sources of income, which introduces opportunities for error, 
overpayments and fraud.
•	 	Rules	on	non-financial	circumstances.	We	similarly	rely	on	customers	letting	 
us know accurately about personal circumstances such as where they live, 
whether they have a partner and whether they have children. 
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15. Significantly reducing complexity would allow a customer’s details to be seen 
as a whole. Reducing system complexity should translate into less error and 
fewer overpayments through fewer mistakes made by staff and customers while 
navigating the system. Overpayments and subsequent recoveries often lead to 
hardship amongst those who can least afford those recoveries.
16. Having one main gateway for customers to access the system should make it 
impossible for customers to represent themselves differently to different parts  
of an organisation and so would further drive down levels of error, overpayments 
and fraud.
17. Access to real-time earnings data would allow for a significant reduction in the 
current levels of error and fraud due to unreported or inaccurately reported 
earnings, as well as the current high levels of overpayment. A single gateway 
would also enhance our ability to pick up on error and fraud associated with  
non-financial customer circumstances. By making intelligent use of data, it could 
be possible to obtain information on a number of customers who are illegitimately 
claiming while living with a partner or fraudulently claiming in more than one area. 
Transition to a new system  
18. A new delivery system would be more straightforward for customers to 
understand, remove the need for the same information to be collected and  
held several times over and speed up key parts of the process. This should  
be considerably more efficient to deliver than the existing system both for 
Government and for businesses. However, we would need to plan carefully  
to ensure that we can move customers smoothly and efficiently from the old  
system to the new. This would be a substantial project, potentially affecting 
millions of customers and businesses. 
19. The introduction of a new system would also need to align with existing plans 
to better target support and simplify the system by closing previous incapacity 
benefits and moving people to more active and work-focused regimes 
(Employment and Support Allowance or Jobseeker’s Allowance, depending  
on their circumstances). We are aiming to re-assess over 1.5 million people on 
incapacity benefits over a three-year period. We envisage that most people will 
have migrated onto their new benefit before a new system could be introduced.
20. In planning the transition to the new system, we would be guided by our principles 
of simplicity, fairness and affordability.  
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Conclusion 
21. To deliver welfare reform we would need to work with all delivery agencies to 
consider carefully the most cost-effective and efficient delivery structure.
22. A new delivery system would not require a major IT project but two smaller 
developments to existing infrastructure. If HM Revenue & Customs takes forward 
reforms to the Pay As You Earn system, real-time earnings data could offer 
significant opportunities to streamline the payment process and respond more 
quickly to fluctuations in income.
23. The reduced complexity of the system and access to real-time earnings data  
could lead to reductions in error, overpayments and fraud.
Question 11
What would be the best way to organise delivery of a reformed system to 
achieve improvements in outcomes, customer service and efficiency?
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6Conclusion. 
1. The previous chapters outlined the kind of approach we are considering to address 
the failings of the current benefits system. These ideas are underpinned by the 
key aims outlined in chapter 1 of a system which improves work incentives, is fair, 
protects those most in need and is simpler. 
2. Reforms could:
•	 	improve	work	incentives	by	reforming	the	way	in	which	benefits	are	 
tapered as incomes rise and allow people to keep more of their earnings;
•	 	be	fair	and	targeted	to	those	most	in	need	through	tapers	which	focus	
payments on those on the lowest incomes, while maintaining levels of  
support for those out of work; and
•	 	provide	simpler	support	paid	to	those	in	or	out	of	work,	by	simplifying	the	
complex array of overlapping in- and out-of-work means-tested benefits  
and Tax Credits.
3. Such changes could enable the Government to reduce worklessness, reduce  
error and fraud and contain welfare costs without increasing costs to business.
4. These ideas recognise that the rapid withdrawal of benefits and Tax Credits 
currently provide little incentive for many to enter work, particularly on low pay. 
Too often, there is little financial reward for greater effort. Benefits, Tax Credits  
and other support are withdrawn quickly at the same time as liability to Income 
Tax and National Insurance contributions increase.
5. A single withdrawal rate would make work pay by reducing Participation Tax Rates 
and Marginal Deduction Rates associated with a move into a job or increased 
hours of work. It would make gains to work much clearer to see, remove complex 
transitions between benefits and Tax Credits and would encourage more people  
to move into work.
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6. Our ideas would contain spending on welfare more widely by focusing support  
to those most in need, building on announcements recently made to target 
support for Child Tax Credit and Housing Benefit on those with the lowest incomes. 
A reformed system would be based on the same structure of entitlement for 
people who are not working as now, including help with housing costs and extra 
support for families, disabled people and carers.
7. Such a system would reflect a balance between supporting those most in need 
and rewarding work and responsibility. We will help people to find work, and these 
reforms will make sure it pays when they do so. They in return will be expected to 
seek work and take work when it is available.
8. An impact assessment, including an equality impact assessment, will be produced 
as part of the policy development process for any proposals that follow. 
9. By actively putting work at the centre of working-age support we want to create a 
new contract with the British people. This contract is about a responsible society 
working together to improve the quality of life for those who are worst off.
10. We would welcome views on the best way forward and in particular on the 
questions posed throughout this discussion document and repeated in chapter 7. 
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7Questions. 
1. What steps should the Government consider to reduce the cost of the welfare 
system and reduce welfare dependency and poverty? 
2. Which aspects of the current benefits and Tax Credits system in particular  
lead to the widely held view that work does not pay for benefit recipients?
3. To what extent is the complexity of the system deterring some people from 
moving into work?
4. To what extent is structural reform needed to deliver customer service 
improvements, drive down administration costs and cut the levels of error, 
overpayments and fraud? 
5. Has the Government identified the right set of principles to use to guide reform?
6. Would an approach along the lines of the models set out in chapter 3 improve 
work incentives and hence help the Government to reduce costs and tackle  
welfare dependency and poverty? Which elements would be most successful? 
What other approaches should the Government consider? 
7. Do you think we should increase the obligations on benefit claimants who  
can work to take the steps necessary to seek and enter work?
8. Do you think that we should have a system of conditionality which aims to 
maximise the amount of work a person does, consistent with their personal 
circumstances?
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9. If you agree that there should be greater localism what local flexibility would  
be required to deliver this?
10. The Government is committed to delivering more affordable homes. How could 
reform best be implemented to ensure providers can continue to deliver the new 
homes we need and maintain the existing affordable homes?
11. What would be the best way to organise delivery of a reformed system to  
achieve improvements in outcomes, customer service and efficiency?
12. Is there anything else you would like to tell us about the proposals in this 
document? 
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Annex 
Seeking views. 
Purpose of the consultation 
1. This discussion document seeks views to inform our thinking on reforms to  
the benefits and Tax Credits system. We would like to hear from all who are 
interested. Subject to the outcome of this consultation, we propose to bring 
forward legislation early in the New Year to reform the current system.
Duration of the consultation 
2. The consultation period begins on 30 July 2010 and runs until 1 October 2010.
Consultation arrangements 
3. Please send your consultation responses to: 
Benefit Reform Division 
Department for Work and Pensions 
1st Floor 
Caxton House 
Tothill Street 
London SW1H 9NA
Email: benefit.reform@dwp.gsi.gov.uk  
Telephone: 0 2 0 7 4 4 9 7 6 8 8
4. Please ensure your response reaches us by 1 October 2010. We will acknowledge 
all responses. Please say whether you are responding as an individual, or on behalf 
of an organisation. If on behalf of an organisation, please make clear who the 
organisation represents, and how the views of members were obtained. 
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5. Copies of this publication can be made available in alternative formats if required.  
We will publish the responses to the consultation in a report on the consultations 
section of our website www.dwp.gov.uk/consultations. The report will summarise 
the responses and our next steps.
Freedom of information
6. The information you send us may need to be passed to colleagues within the 
Department for Work and Pensions, published in a summary of responses received 
and referred to in the published consultation report.
7. All information contained in your response may be subject to publication or disclosure 
if requested under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. By providing personal 
information for the purposes of the public consultation exercise, it is understood 
that you consent to its disclosure and publication. If this is not the case, you should 
limit any personal information provided, or remove it completely. If you want the 
information in your response to the consultation to be kept confidential, you should 
explain why as part of your response, although we cannot guarantee to do this.
The consultation criteria 
8. The consultation is being conducted in line with the Government Code of Practice  
on Consultation www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/consultation-guidance/
page44420.html. The seven consultation criteria are:
•	 	When to Consult. Formal consultation should take place at a stage when there 
is scope to influence the outcome.
•	 	Duration of consultation exercises. The Government Code of Practice on 
Consultation recommends a minimum 12-week consultation period for public 
consultations, unless there are good reasons for a limited consultation period.  
In this case, we are consulting on general principles only. We intend to further 
consult on specific details as these are is developed, and therefore our Minister  
has agreed that a limited consultation is appropriate.
•	 	Clarity of scope and impact. Consultation documents should be clear about the 
consultation process, what is being proposed, the scope to influence, and the 
expected costs and benefits of the proposals.
•	  Accessibility of consultation exercises. Consultation exercises should be designed 
to be accessible to, and clearly targeted at, those people the exercise is designed  
to reach.
•	 	The burden of consultation. Keeping the burden of consultation to a minimum is 
essential if consultations are to be effective and if consultees’ buy-in to the process 
is to be obtained.
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•	 	Responsiveness of consultation exercises. Consultation responses should 
be analysed carefully and clear feedback should be provided to participants 
following the consultation.
•	  Capacity to consult. Officials running consultation exercises should seek 
guidance in how to run an effective consultation exercise, and share what  
they have learned from the experience.
9. An online version of this consultation will be available shortly after the  
publication. You can access this from the website: 
www.dwp.gov.uk/21st-century-welfare. 
Feedback on this consultation
10. We value your feedback on how well we consult. If you have any comments on  
the process of this consultation, for example, how it could be improved, but not 
about the issues raised, please contact our Consultation Coordinator:
Roger Pugh 
DWP Consultation Coordinator 
1st Floor 
Crown House 
2 Ferensway 
Hull HU2 8NF
Email: roger.pugh@dwp.gsi.gov.uk
Impact assessment
11. The purpose of this discussion document is to inform the general direction of 
reform in the benefit and Tax Credits system. We are seeking views on the ideas 
covered by this document in order to inform the development of firm proposals. 
We will assess the impact of our more detailed proposals and we will produce 
a full Impact Assessment at the appropriate time. We will be considering 
equality impacts as the policy develops and we will produce an Equality Impact 
Assessment. During the consultation process we would welcome views on the 
impact of the ideas on the people covered by equality legislation to inform the 
Equality Impact Assessment.
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